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Abstract: The U.S. agricultural food processing and retailing industries have become 
increasingly concentrated. Therefore, numerous studies have investigated the impact of 
changes in market structures. This paper examines the importance of the bilateral 
relationship between retailers and processors in estimating market power parameters in 
imperfectly competitive markets. The model developed in this study allows one to 
estimate conjectural elasticities of input and output markets for processors and retailers 
separately without imposing the fixed proportions technology assumption. This study 
uses the primal approach to estimate the degree of market power without imposing the 
symmetry assumption on conjectural elasticities of input and output markets. To 
demonstrate the importance of considering the bilateral relationship between retailers and 
processors, we first generate industry data for market structures such as perfect 
competition, monopoly, monopsony, two-way bilateral competition, and four-way 
bilateral competition. The importance of using more general and flexible frameworks is 
demonstrated using likelihood dominance criterion (LDC), and biases in estimates of 
market power parameters and industry indices. We find that the model correctly estimates 
market power and flexible enough to consider the full range of the bilateral market power 
exertion. The four-way bilateral competition model is applied to the U.S. beef industry 
estimating conjectural elasticities from input and output markets, and corresponding 
market power indices. Sensitivity analysis is conducted using alternative functional forms 
of production function. Empirical results show that processors and retailers exercise 
market power in both input and output markets in the U.S. beef industry. Furthermore, 
estimated market power parameters and market power indices are sensitive to the choice 
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As agricultural food processing and retailing industries become increasingly concentrated, 
there have been numerous studies examining the impact of changes in market structures. 
Previous studies in New Empirical Industrial Organization (NEIO) focus on market 
structures such as horizontal concentration and vertical integration as sources of market 
power while maintaining hypothesis of price taking behavior on one side of the market 
(Appelbaum 1982; Bresnahan 1982; Lau 1982; Schroeter 1988; Atkinson and Kerkvliet 
1989; Azzam 1997; Sexton 2000; Paul 2001; Chung and Tostao 2012). These studies 
assume that processors have oligopoly and/or oligopsony market power. However, the 
one-sided measure of market power may lead to inaccurate results about market power 




A few recent studies consider bilateral imperfect competition relationship between 
sellers and buyers and estimate the potential market power exertion with more flexible 
models (Raper, Love and Shumway 2000; Chung and Tostao 2012). Raper, Love and 
Shumway (2000) ) extend traditional NEIO methods by developing a model that allows 
market power exertion in both input and output markets. The model was augmented through 
likelihood dominance criterion (LDC) and Monte Carlo experiments to demonstrate the 
general model appropriately estimates parameters of market power from both sides of a 
market and of firms’ technology. Empirical results from the U.S. leaf tobacco market show 
that cigarette manufacturers exercise some level of monopsony power while no monopoly 
power is exerted by the producers. Chung and Tostao (2012) consider a bilateral imperfect 
competition model between processors and retailers to measure the effect of increased 
concentration on industry market power and cost efficiency.  They find processors tend to 
exercise oligopsony market power in procuring cattle but are unlikely to exercise market 
power on retailers. Market power effects are larger when processors and retailers are 
combined as single sector than when retailers are separated. Efficiency effects from the 
increased concentration in the U.S. beef packing industry are also slightly larger than market 
power effects when retailers and processors considered as one integrated sector. Although the 
two previous papers, Raper, Love and Shumway (2000), and Chung and Tostao (2012), 
recognize the importance of considering the bilateral relationship between processors and 
retailers, at least one side of market is limited to be competitive in these studies. 
Most studies addressing market power issues in the industrial organization literature 
adopt a dual approach suing a firm’s cost function. This approach is limited in deriving an 
expression for the conjectural elasticity in the factor market unless the production technology 
3 
 
is restricted to fixed proportions between the output and input. Consequently, conjectural 
elasticities in the imperfect output and procured input markets turn out to be the same 
because quantities of output and input become identical due to the fixed proportions 
technology (Schroeter 1988). However, the identical market in the two markets is too 
restrictive because it is not an implication of the oligopoly and oligopsony theory, but is 
solely a result of the imposed production technology in the dual approach.  
The purpose of this paper is to develop a general model that can estimate a four-way 
market power exertion when processors and retailers have potential market power in both 
buying (input) and selling (output) markets. Unlike traditional NEIO models, the general 
model is flexible enough to estimate a four-way bilateral market power that processors and 
retailers potentially exercise in both input and output markets, i.e., processors’ oligopsony 
and oligopoly power and retailers’ oligopsony and oligopoly power. To demonstrate the 
importance of considering the four-way bilateral relationship between retailers and 
processors, Monte Carlo experiments first generate industry data for market structures such 
as perfect competition, monopoly, monopsony, two-way bilateral competition, and four-way 
bilateral competition. Then, the generated data are used to estimate NEIO models with true as 
well as alternative market structures. The importance of using more general and flexible 
frameworks is demonstrated using likelihood dominance criterion (LDC
1
), and biases in 
estimates of market power parameters and market power indices
2
. To ensure the four-way 
bilateral competition, i.e., four different market power parameters in estimation, the general 
model is derived based on the primal approach (or production function approach) in this 
study. Most traditional NEIO methods use the dual approach (or the cost function approach) 
along with the fixed proportions assumption, which results in the same conjectural elasticities 
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(market power parameters) of input and output markets. The primal can estimate the degree 
of market power without imposing the symmetry assumption on conjectural elasticities of 
input and output markets. Therefore, the primal approach does not require the fixed 
proportion assumption. 
Results of Monte Carlo simulations show four-way bilateral competition model 
prefers to all alternative models with 100% certainty. Even if the true market structures are 
alternative models such as perfect competition, monopoly, and monopsony, the four-way 
model is chosen against the true models. The test results on market power parameter bias 
indicate that any erroneous modeling of market structures can lead to biased market power 
parameter estimates when the true market structure is the four-way bilateral model. Results 
also show that all alternative model specifications result in biased estimates of market power 
indices when the four-way model is the true market structure. 
 
Literature Review 
Many studies have used the new empirical industrial organization (NEIO) approach 
proposed by Appelbaum (1979, 1982) and Bresnahan (1982) to investigate the market power 
issue in various markets. The NEIO approach focuses on market conduct such as overall 
market reactions to an individual firm’s change in output supply and input demand. 
Appelbaum (1982) considers oligopolistic market and provides an empirical framework to 
test various hypotheses on pricing behavior about non-competitive behavior. The study 
presents an empirical procedure to estimate the degree of imperfectly competitive behavior at 
the market level. Azzam (1997) models oligopsony only for separating the market power 
effects and efficiency effects associated with higher concentration in factor markets in the 
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U.S. beef packing industry. The study finds that the cost efficiency effect is larger than 
oligopsony market power effect. Paul (2001) estimates packers’ market power in the beef 
input market and cost (utilization, scale, and scope) economies using monthly cost and 
revenue data from a survey of the forty-three largest U.S. beef packing plants between 1992 
to 1993. Lopez, Azzam and Espana (2002) develop the oligopoly model analogous to the 
Azzam’s oligopsony model to estimate market power and efficiency effects in oligopoly 
markets. Lopez, Azzam and Espana applies the oligopoly model to 32 U.S. food processing 
industries and finds that oligopoly power effects dominate cost efficiency effects in the meat 
packing industry. Schroeter (1988) adopts Appelbaum’s technique for the assessment of 
monopolistic and monopsonistic performance. He estimates the monopoly/monopsony price 
distortion in the U.S. beef packing industry and finds distortions to be quite small but 
statistically significant. These studies tend to focus on processors alone and assume market 
power exercise is limited to one side of the market. 
Many recent studies consider bilateral relationship between retailers and processors 
and measure the potential market power exertion from both sides of the market (Raper, Love 
and Shumway 2000; Chung and Tostao 2012). Raper, Love and Shumway (2000) develop a 
composite and flexible model to test market power exertion allowing the possibility that 
market power is exerted by firms on either or both the purchasing and selling sides of a 
market transaction in intermediate goods markets. Chung and Tostao (2012) follow Azzam 
(1997) and Lopez, Azzam and Espana (2002) theoretical work but consider bilateral 
imperfect competition between processors and retailers. The study estimates tradeoffs 
between market power and cost efficiency and examine the effects of horizontal 
consolidation in the U.S. beef processing industry using a bilateral imperfect competition 
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model. One limitation of these studies is that conjectural elasticities are identical in output 
and input markets due to the use of the dual cost function approach.  
In response to critiques on the limitations of the dual approach, a few studies use the 
production function approach that allows potentially different conjectural elasticities in input 
and output markets without imposing the assumption of fixed proportion technology (Azzam 
and Pagoulatos 1990; Chang and Tremblay 1991; Mei and Sun 2008). Azzam and Pagoulatos 
(1990) estimate conjectural elasticities for input and output markets of the U.S. meat packing 
industry and find that the industry is imperfectly competitive in both markets. Chang and 
Tremblay (1991) present an analytical derivation of indices (similar to Lerner Index) that can 
reflect degrees of market power in input and output markets. The study first develops a firm-
level index and then extends it to the market-level index. The market level index is a market 
share weighted index from the firm-level index. Mei and Sun (2008) also use the production 
function approach to estimate oligopoly and oligopsony market power in the U.S. paper 
industry. The study finds the presence of market power in both paper products and pulpwood 
markets for the past several decades. Although recent studies, e.g., Raper, Love and 
Shumway (2000) and Chung and Tostao (2012), examine the bilateral relationship between 
retailers’ and processors’ market power by employing more flexible models than previous 
studies, the models developed in these studies are yet not flexible enough to consider the full 
range of the four-way bilateral market power relationship. These models do not allow one to 
estimate the potential market power of retailers and processors separately in each of input 
and output markets. 
Our study develops by far the most flexible model that considers the full range of the 
bilateral market power relationship between retailers and processors and investigates the 
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importance of this consideration in estimating the degree of market power. We draw on 
Raper, Love and Shumway (2000) and Chung and Tostao (2012), but our study differs from 
these studies at least in two areas. First, our study begins deriving a conceptual model from 
separates processors’ and retailers’ profit maximization problems and combine first order 
condition of these maximization problems using the bilateral relationship. The model 
includes four conjectural elasticities that represent retailers’ and processors’ market power in 
input and output markets, respectively. Therefore, unlike previous studies, it allows one to 
estimate the full range of the bilateral market power relationship between retailers and 
processors. Second, our model is based on the production function approach so that it does 
not require the symmetry assumption on conjectural elasticities between input and output 
markets. Most previous studies are based on the dual approach which requires identical 




 In general, there are two approaches in developing a theoretical framework of conjectural 
elasticity in the NEIO literature. One is the primal approach which employs a production 
function in the specification of a firm’s profit maximization problem. In optimum when 
profit is maximized, the input demands can be derived by the Hotelling’s lemma. The other is 
the dual approach which uses a cost function in specifying a firm’s profit maximization 
problem. In optimum when cost is minimized, the input demand equations are obtained by 
the Shephard’s lemma. In both cases, conjectural elasticity can be identified and the system 
of equations for output production and input demands in equilibrium can be jointly estimated. 
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However, one limitation of the dual cost function approach is that the derivation of 
conjectural elasticity in input market is not straightforward unless the production technology 
is restricted to fixed proportions (Azzam and pagoulatos 1990). In the cost function approach, 
the market output and input are represented by an identical variable in the profit function 
with appropriately chosen dimensions to derive the conjectural elasticity in the input market 
(Schroeter 1988)
3
. As a result, identical conjectural elasticities are derived by factor and 
output markets under the dual cost function framework. To avoid this limitation, we use the 
production function approach that allows potentially different degree of market power in 
input and output markets. 
Consider a processor firm that uses a vector of inputs, z, with associated prices, w, to 
produce a single output,   , for sale as an input to retailer firms. The jth firm’s production 
function can be stated as:  
(1)                                 
      
 
     , 
where   
 
is the output produced,   
 
 is the farm input,     (indexed u=1,…, U) represents 
non-farm inputs such as labor, capital, and materials that are purchased from a competitive 
market. Furthermore, assume each firm exercises some degree of market power in purchasing 
the farm input,   
 
 and in selling its output,   
 
. The inverse market demand function is given 
by: 
(2)                                       , 
where   and    ∑   
  
    are the price per unit of the processed output and the total 
industry output. The inverse market supply function for the specific factor input is given by:  
(3)                                        , 
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where   and    ∑   
  
    are market farm input price and total industry input. Denoting 
the price of non-farm inputs by         and assuming each firm is a profit maximizing. 
Thus, the profit maximization problem for the representative j
th 
processors firm can be stated 
as: 
(4)                                 
          
          
 
 ∑      
 
   ,                                
for j=1, 2,…, N, subject to (2) and (3). The first-order necessary conditions corresponding to 
this maximization problem are given by (see Appendix A for detailed derivation): 
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Now, consider a retailer firm that uses a vector of inputs, x, with associated prices, v, 
to produce a single output, y
r
, for sale to consumers. Let the firm i
th
 production function be:  
(9)                                 
   (  
     ),        
where   
  is retail output,   
 
 is the processed input,     (indexed k=1, …, K) represent other 
inputs like as labor, capital, and materials that is purchased from a competitive market. The 
inverse market demand function is given by: 
(10)                                       , 
where    ∑   
  
    is the total industry output, and  
  is the price per unit of the retail 
output. The inverse market supply of the specific factor is given by: 
(11)                                       , 
where    and    ∑   
  
    are market processed input price and total industry input from 
the processor. Denoting the price of non-farm inputs by        , and assuming each firm is 
a profit maximize. The profit maximization problem for the i
th
 retailer firm can be stated as: 
(12)                                 
          
          
  ∑      
 
   . 
The first-order necessary conditions corresponding to this profit maximization problem are 
given by (see Appendix A for the detailed derivation): 
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The conjectural elasticities                 provide useful benchmarks in 
investigating competitive behavior and allow one to carry out various tests about market 
structure (Azzam and Pagoulatos 1990). The parameter    [   ] and    [   ] measure 
the departures from competition in selling output.     [   ] and    [   ] measure the 
departures from competition in buying an input. Assuming positive marginal products, if 
both    and    are equal to 0 in equations (7) and (8), we have the perfectly competitive case 
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where each firm equates the value of marginal product of each input to its marginal cost in 
the processing sector. In the extreme case where both    and    are equal to 1, we obtain the 
monopoly and monopsony case. Other combinations of market structures can be identified 
with the values that denote various degrees of oligopoly/oligopsony power with higher values 
of both    and    indicating greater departures from competitive behavior.  
The parameters           are playing a similar role in the retailing sector. If both 
          are equal to 0 in equations (15) and (16), we have the perfectly competitive case 
for retailing sector. When           are equal to 1, we obtain the monopoly and monopsony 
case. Other values denote various degrees of oligopoly and oligopsony power with higher 
values of both         . 
The market power index
4
 is the difference between the value of the marginal product 
and the input price all divided by the value of the marginal product. This approach is similar 
to that developed by Lerner (1932), who defined the index of monopoly price distortions as 
the difference between the output price and marginal cost divided by the price. The market 
power index for processor firm j is derived such as: 
(17)                                
  [  (  
  
 )    ]  [  (  
  
 )]. 
Rearranging this equation with market power parameters becomes: 











Because the value of the marginal product at the processor level is greater than or 
equal to    for competitive or imperfectly competitive market, the value of  
 
 should range 
between 0 and 1. When the factor is paid equal to the value of its marginal 
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product,   (  
  
 )    , then  
    and the industry is efficient (competitive) in both 
input and output markets. As the difference in the value of the marginal product and the 
factor price increases,  
 
 approaches 1. Thus, greater inefficiency is implied by the higher 
values of  
 
. In the processor sector,  
  
  
  reflects the non-competitive performance in the 
output market and reduces to the well-known Lerner index of 
 
  








for the pure monopsonist. An index for retailers is obtained by similar procedure. The index 
for retailers plays a similar role and is obtained in an analogous manner for firm level. The 
index for retailer firm i is derived such as: 











In practice, the absence of firm-level data generally requires an additional assumption 
to make the preceding analysis relevant to the behavior of the industry as whole. We assume 
that at equilibrium, conjectural elasticities in processing and retail sectors are invariant across 
firms, i.e.,           , and          . The conjectural elasticities in the 
retailing sector, also, are invariant across the firm           and          . 
Then, the aggregate analogue of the optimality condition in processing and retailing sector 
can be written as:  
(20)                               
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Therefore, the industry-level market power index for processor and retailer can be stated as:                        



























Monte Carlo experiments and empirical estimation of NEIO models require a specific 
functional form for the production function in equations (4) and (12). It is desirable that the 
functional form does not impose severe a priori constraints on the production characteristics 
of the industry. One flexible functional form that has been generally adopted in many NEIO 
models is the generalized Leontief production function (Diwert 1971)
5
. The generalized 
Leontief production functions for the processor that uses a vector of inputs, Z, to produce a 
single output,    is: 
(26)                  
                          
    
 
       
    
 
          
                        
    
 
            
 
            
 
            
 
 .                                                  
We assume that in addition to the farm input (  ), there are three competitively priced inputs 
utilized by the processor: labor (  ), capital (  ), and material (  ). From equation (26), we 
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can get the marginal product of input for processors (see Appendix B for detailed derivation). 
Substituting the marginal product of input into Equation (20) and (21), and rearranging, leads: 
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 )    , 




 (for        ) is the share equation for the uth input for the processors.   
and   are parameter index of monopolistic and monopsonistic market power exertion which 
is bounded between 0 and 1.  
  Now, consider the retailer firm that produces a single output,   , using the 
intermediate goods produced by the processor firm as its primary input,   , and a vector of 
other inputs, X, is written: 
(29)                         
                          
    
 
        
    
 
  
                              
    
 
            
 
            
 
            
 
 . 
Similarly, retailer’s marginal product and share equations are obtained as: 






























(31)                                
  (  
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 (for        )  is the share equations for the kth input for retailers. 
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Equations (26) to (31) constitute a system of ten equations in total. For empirical estimation 
and Monte Carlo simulation, the production function and the share equations are assumed to 
be stochastic due to technical and optimization errors. The errors are assumed to be additive 
multivariate normal distributed and added to each structural equation. 
 
Data 
The data used in the Monte Carlo simulations are monthly data series for the U.S. beef 
industry ranging from years 1980 to 2011. The data are compiled from the National 
Agricultural Statistic Service (NASS), Grain Inspection, Packers and Stockyards 
Administration (GIPSA), and the Economic Research Service (ERS) of the United State 
Department of Agriculture (USDA). 
Total beef production represented by steer and heifer slaughter quantities is compiled 
from Livestock Slaughter Annual Summary of National Agricultural Statistics Service 
(NASS), United States Department of Agriculture (USDA). Total cattle input supply is 
represented by the cattle slaughter quantity in total live weight (NASS, USDA), and prices of 
labor, capital, and material inputs for the U.S. beef packing industry (NAICS code: 3116) are 
obtained from the Industry Productivity and Costs Database of Bureau of Labor Statistics 
(BLS), United States Department of Labor (USDL). The Herfindahl-Hirschman index for the 
U.S. beef processing industry is the steer and heifer slaughter concentration index compiled 
from several annual reports from the Packers and Stockyards Statistical Report (1996-2011), 
Grain Inspection, Packers and Stockyards Administration (GIPSA), USDA. Prices series of 
wholesale and cattle is provided by ERS, USDA.  
17 
 
Retail output is represented by the total US commercial beef production obtained 
from red meat year book (ERS, USAD). Prices of labor, capital, and material inputs for food 
retailers are obtained from the Major Sector Multifactor Productivity Index Database (BLS, 
USDL). Retail Herfindhal-Hirschman Index (HHI) data are available only for years 1992, 
1997, 2002, and 2007 which is estimated using sales data of the 50 largest grocery stores in 
the United States. Given the paucity of data, the Herfindhal-Hirschman Index data for the 
remaining years are estimated in time series regression. The retail sales data are obtained 
from several issues of the Progressive Grocer Magazine (Progressive Grocer, 1970-2002) 
and the U.S. Census Bureau. The retail price of beef is compiled from ERS, USDA. 
For the beef supply equation and the processed beef supply equation, the productivity 
of labor, capital and the food processing materials are obtained from the Major Sector 
Multifactor Productivity Index Database (BLS, USDL). The productivity of labor, capital 
and materials for the U.S. animal slaughtering and processing industries are obtained from 
the Industry Productivity and Cost Database (BLS, USDL). The definitions and descriptive 
statistics of these variables are presented in Table I-1. 
 
Monte Carlo Experiments 
To demonstrate the importance of the bilateral relationship between retailers and processors 
in estimating market power parameters, we first simulate industry data under alternative 
industry structures using Monte Carlo techniques and then estimate market power parameters 
for each simulated structure. To do so, we use known or ‘true’ market power parameter for 
each simulated industry data. The true market power parameters are compared with estimated 
parameters obtained from various market power estimation procedures. We simulate the 
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share equations from (26) to (31) for six ‘true’ market structures: perfect competition, 
monopoly, monopsony, combined two-way bilateral imperfect competition, separated two-
way bilateral imperfect competition, and four-way bilateral imperfect competition. Combined 
two-way bilateral imperfect competition is similar to the models considered in previous study 
(Schroeter 1988; Chung and Tostao 2012). In this case, retailers and processors are integrated 
in a single ‘processing/retailing’ sector, which competes imperfectly in procuring farm inputs 
from a perfectly competitive farm sector and in selling processed product to consumers. 
Separated two-way bilateral imperfect competition is derived from the models used in 
previous study (Raper, Love and Shumway 2000). In this case, processors are allowed to 
have oligopoly power in selling processed product to retailers. Retailers are allowed to have 
oligopsony power in procuring processed output from processors. Four-way bilateral 
imperfect competition nests the Raper, Love and Shumway (2000) and Chung and Tostao 
(2012). This model allows having processors’ oligopsony and oligopoly power and retailers’ 
oligopsony and oligopoly power.  
Firm level data are a rarity in real world application. Since we seek to closely imitate 
data limitations faced by researchers, industry data are generated for each market structure. 
One thousand data sets with the three hundred and eighty observations are generated for each 
market structure. Data generating procedure is as follows. First, derive a conceptual model 
from separates processors’ and retailers’ profit maximization problems. Second, assume 
perfectly competitive market in both processors and retailers and estimate equations from (26) 
to (31) simultaneously, and then we can get parameters used as starting values and the 
variance-covariance matrix. Third, we construct variance-covariance matrix used to simulate 
random error using Cholesky decomposition method. Fourth, additive multivariate normal 
19 
 
errors appended to each structural equation for stochastic simulation of endogenous variables. 
Finally, generate industry data for each market structure using known or true market power 
parameters. The design matrix for the parameters and the variance-covariance matrix used to 
simulate random error term are given in Appendix C. The exogenous and endogenous 
variables used in simulating market data are presented in Table I-1. Additive multivariate 
normal errors are assumed to each structural equation for stochastic simulation of 
endogenous variables. Appendix D contains functional form for simulated and estimated 
market structures. 
Competitive market data are simulated by jointly aggregate versions of share 
equations for both the processor and retailer firm and production function for processors and 
retailers. These equations are based on equations (4) and (12) and solved for 
  
    
    
    
    , and    using processors and retailers production functions given in 
equations (26) and (29). All conjectural elasticities are set to be zero where each firm equates 
the marginal product of each input to its real price. The monopoly solution is obtained 
assuming the processor firm maximizes profit by exercising monopoly power while the 
retailer firm behaves passively. In this case, the conjectural elasticity,  , is equal to 1, but the 
conjectural elasticities,          , are equal to 0. The monopsony solution is obtained 
similarly assuming the retail firm maximizes profit by exercising monopsony power subject 
to the processor firm competitively determining intermediate good supply. The conjectural 
elasticity,  , is equal to 1 and the others are equal to 0.  
In the two-way bilateral imperfect competition case, we consider two cases. First, the 
combined (or integrated processing-retailing) two-way bilateral imperfect competition model 
is considered. In this case, an integrated processing-retailing firm competes imperfectly in 
20 
 
procuring farm inputs and in selling processed products to consumers. This type of bilateral 
imperfect competition model is similar to the models considered in previous studies such as 
Schroeter (1988) and Chung and Tostao (2012). For this case, we set both conjectural 
elasticities,       , are equal to 0.5, respectively. Second, the separated two way bilateral 
imperfect competition is considered. In this case, we consider two separate firms:  processor 
and retailer, where processor has only some degree of oligopoly power in selling processed 
products to retailers while retailer has only some degree of oligopsony power in buying 
processed product from processors. Conjectural elasticities,        , are set at 0.5, 
respectively for this case. Four-way bilateral imperfect competition allows both processor 
and retailer to have oligopoly power in selling output and to have oligopsony power in 
procuring input. In this case, we set all conjectural elasticities to be 0.25. In addition, 
absolute values of demand elasticities,   
        
  are given as 0.45 and supply elasticities, 
  
 
       
 




Results of Estimated Market Structures and Hypothesis Tests 
Each econometric specification is estimated as a system of ten simultaneous equations 
(  
    
    
    
           ) with additive multivariate normal errors using full information 
maximum likelihood estimation procedure. The method of instrumental variables is used 
because some variables in equations (for example, output and factors) are endogenous. The 
instrumental variables included in the estimation are prices of the three inputs in processing 
and retailing sectors, Herfindahl-Hirschman indices for the US beef processing and retailing 
industries, per capita disposable income, and time trend.  
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Table I-2 shows mean values and standard deviations for estimated market power 
parameters in alternative models for each simulated (true) market structure. When the true 
market structure is four-way bilateral imperfect competition, the misspecified alternative 
econometric specifications estimate the market power parameter to be significantly different 
from its true value. The four-way bilateral imperfect competition model performs equally as 
the perfect competition, monopoly, monopsony, and separated two-way bilateral imperfect 
competition specifications in estimating market power parameters. This is a remarkable result 
because the four-way bilateral imperfect competition model does not require a priori 
restriction that limits market power exercise in one side of market at least and is able to 
estimate correct market power parameters from true market structures.  
Three statistical tests, model selection test using LDC, test for biases in estimated 
market power parameters, and test for biases in estimated market power indices, are used to 
demonstrate the importance of using the four-way bilateral model in measuring the degree of 
market power. Market structures considered in this study include perfect competition, 
monopoly, monopsony, two-way bilateral competition, and four-way bilateral competition. 
First, the LDC test use the likelihood ratio test that requires maximum likelihood estimates of 
the two hypotheses,   (true market structure) and   (alternative market structure). 
Following Pollack and Wales (1991), 
   is preferred to    if   
(32)                                     [               ]  , 
   is preferred to    if  
(33)                                     [               ]  , 
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where    and    denote the log likelihoods corresponding to each hypothesis and      
denote the critical values of the chi-square distribution with v degrees of freedom at 5% 
significance level.    and    denote the number of independent parameters in each null and 
alternative hypothesis. 
LDC cannot define between    and    if  
(34)                               
[               ]
 
       
[               ]
 
. 
Since    and    are known and    and    are obtained from model estimations, the LDC test 
is easily implemented.  The appropriate upper and lower critical values are computed for 
each pairwise comparison at the 5% significance level. 
Results of model selection tests are reported in Table I-3. Pairwise comparisons 
between  null (true) and each alternative econometric specification shows that the four-way 
bilateral imperfect competition model should be used to estimate the four-way market power 
parameters for retailers’ and processors’ potential market power in both input and output 
markets. When the true market structure is the four-way bilateral imperfect competition, the 
LDC rejects the misspecified alternative econometric specifications while favoring the 
simulated market structure 100% of the time. Even if the true market structure  are perfect 
competition, Monopoly, are Monopsony, LDCs clearly choose the four-way bilateral 
imperfect competition over the true market structures 117 times, 95 times, and 171 times, 
respectively. If we include undefined cases between true and alternative models, the four-
way model is chosen against the true perfect competition, monopoly, and monopsony models 
28.8%, 41.1%, and 39.7% of the time, respectively. When two-way combined model is true, 
LDC chooses the four-way bilateral imperfect competition over the true model 89 times. 
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When two-way separated model is true, the four-way model is favored 135 times while 364 
cases are undefined. 
Results from Table I-3 clearly show the importance of using the four-way model to 
estimate the bilateral market power relationship between retailers and processors and that the 
four-way model is flexible enough to represent other alternative market structures. The 
second method to demonstrate the importance of modeling four-way bilateral imperfect 
competition in NEIO framework is to test biases of estimated market power parameters. The 
true market power parameters used in generating market level data are compared to those 
estimated from alternative market structures. The null hypothesis is that there is no bias 
between the market power parameters of the simulated market structure and each alternative 
econometric specification, and standard t-tests are carried out at the 5% significance level.  
T-test results on market power parameter bias are presented in Table I-4. When the 
four-way bilateral imperfect competition is the true structure, market power parameter biases 
from alternative market structures such as monopoly, monopsony, and two-way bilateral 
imperfect competition models are all statistically different from zero. Therefore, the results 
indicate that any erroneous modeling of market structures can lead to biased market power 
parameter estimates when the true market structure is the four-way bilateral relationship. 
Even if true market structures are perfect competition monopoly, monopsony, and two-way 
bilateral imperfect competition, the flexible four-way model is able to estimate correct 
market power parameters with zero biases except monopoly and combined two-way bilateral 
imperfect competition. The t-test results on market power parameter estimates show that the 
four-way bilateral imperfect competition model has a clear advantage in estimating market 
power parameters. In other words, the four-way bilateral imperfect competition model could 
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be more flexible than the two-way bilateral imperfect competition model and one direction 
models. Overall, the results are consistent with the LDC results from Table I-3.  
Finally, market power indices that reflect overall degree of industry market power 
from both input and output markets are estimated and tested if they statistically differ from 
the true indices. Again, the true indices are computed from the parameter values used in 
generating data. The biases between true and estimated values are non-parametrically tested 
using 95% confidence intervals without assigning any particular probability distributions. 
Table I-5 presents confidence intervals for market power index bias between true and 
alternative models. With the four-way model specification as the true market structure, all 
alternative model specifications result in biased estimates of market power indices. The result 
is consistent with results from LDC and market power parameter bias tests in table I-3 and I-
4, respectively. Even if the true market structure is perfectly competitive, monopoly, 
monopsony, or two-way bilateral relationship, the four-way model estimates corresponding 
market power indices correctly in some cases. For example, when true market structure is 
perfectly competitive, the four-way model results in no biased estimates compared to the true 
parameters. When monopoly is the true market structure, the four-way model correctly 
estimates for processors’ index while the four-way model correctly estimates retailers’ index 
correctly when the true market structure is monopsony. When the simulated market structure 
is the separated two-way bilateral imperfect competition, the four-way model correctly 







Many recent studies have estimated potential market power effects from increased 
concentration for various industries. However, these studies assess market power effects of 
an integrated processor-retailer industry or bilateral imperfect competition markets while 
imposing restriction in the direction of market power exertion. 
This paper considers bilateral imperfect competition between processors and retailers 
and demonstrates the importance of modeling processors’ and retailers’ oligopoly and 
oligopsony power in both input and output market. Our study estimates conjectural 
elasticities of input and output markets for processors and retailers separately employing the 
primal production function approach. To validate our bilateral market power exertion 
between processors and retailers, we first generate market data under various market 
structures using Monte Carlo techniques and then estimate market power parameters for each 
simulated structure. The importance of using more general and flexible frameworks is 
demonstrated using likelihood dominance criterion (LDC), and biases in estimates of market 
power parameters and market power indices 
Results suggest that the general framework developed in this study does not make a 
priori assumptions regarding the direction of market power exertion and is also flexible 
enough to allow the full range of market structures. Results of Monte Carlo simulations 
clearly showed the importance of using the four-way model to estimate the bilateral market 
power relationship between retailers and processors and that the four-way model is flexible 
enough to represent other alternative market structures. When the true market structure is the 
four-way bilateral imperfect competition, the LDC model selection test rejects the 
misspecified alternative econometric specifications while favoring the simulated market 
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structure 100% of the time. Even if the true market structure is one of alternative structures, 
the test chooses the four-way bilateral imperfect competition over the true market structures 
in many cases.  
Results from bias tests on market power parameter estimates indicate that any 
erroneous modeling of market structures can lead to biased market power parameter 
estimates when the true market structure is the four-way bilateral relationship. Even if true 
market structures are perfect competition monopoly, monopsony, and two-way bilateral 
imperfect competition, the flexible four-way model is able to estimate correct market power 
parameters with zero biases in most cases.  
Finally, results of bias tests with market power indices were consistent with those 
from LDC and market power parameter bias tests. When the true market structure is the four-
way bilateral-imperfect competitive, all alternative model specifications result in biased 
estimates of market power indices. Even if the true market structure is perfectly competitive, 
monopoly, monopsony, or two-way bilateral relationship, the four-way model estimates 













1. Pollak and Wales (1991) propose a new asymptotic criterion for model selection. 
Their approach to model selection is based on two new concepts: dominance 
ordering and the likelihood dominance criterion (LDC). The LDC generalizes the 
dominance ordering by considering a set of admissible composite parametric sizes 
rather than a single composite parametric size. See Pollak and Wales (1991) and 
Raper et al., (2000). 
2. This index allows for non-competitive behavior in both factor and output markets. 
Chang and Tremblay (1991) refer as an oligopsony/oligopoly index. 
3. Although Schroeter developed a measure of monopsony power, it applies only to 
the special case where the production technology is characterized by fixed 
proportions between the quantity of output and the quantity of the demand input. 
4. This approach is similar to the Lerner Index developed by Lerner (1932), who 
defined the index of monopoly price distortions as the difference between the 
output price and marginal cost divided by the price. The market power index for 
firm level is: 
The share equation (7),  
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Multiplying both sides by -1 and adding  
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 Simplifying and rearranging results in:  
   
  
   















                                                                                                        
In previous studies, Lerner index for the monopoly is defined as; 
   





 , where   
 
 is the price elasticity of demand.                                                                                                          
In this study, the market power index for the monopolist firm j is defined as; 
  
  
   
  
   





                  
5. The generalized Leontief production function is one of the most flexible 
functional forms, permitting the partial elasticities of substitution between inputs 
to vary.  
6. The demand elasticities are obtained from Brester and Wohlgenana (1993). The 
supply elasticities are from USDA, ERS. In this paper, each demand and supply 
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Mean SD Minimum Maximum 
Herfindahl Hirschman index for 
steer and heifer slaughter 
   0.1646 0.0475 0.0561 0.2268 
Herfindahl Hirschman index for 
grocery retailers 
   0.0397 0.0247 0.0081 0.0763 
Commercial beef production 
(billion lbs.) 
   2.0489 0.1825 1.653 2.512 
Wholesale beef production 
(billion lbs.) 
   2.7377 0.2218 2.2275 4.1485 
Cattle slaughter weight  
(billion lbs.) 
   3.4221 0.2772 2.7843 4.1485 
Retail price of beef ($/cwt)    120.28 15.579 92.23 156.41 
Wholesale value of beef ($/cwt)    80.058 3.248 73.926 92.314 
Farm value of beef    69.280 1.299 62.843 74.899 
Labor productivity for food and 
other industry (2005=100) 
      94.71 8.24 80.78 109.11 
Capital productivity (2005=100)       102.78 2.909 96.54 107.48 
Material productivity 
(2005=100) 
      86.04 13.43 67.10 106.19 
Price of labor (2005=100)    109.07 4.361 100.00 119.73 
Price of capital (2005=100)    125.91 13.24 97.06 148.91 
Price of material (2005=100)    93.00 3.737 85.52 100.63 
Labor productivity for animal 
slaughtering and processing 
(2005=100) 
      97.97 8.659 83.57 112.85 




    
91.81 9.077 78.18 114.15 
Price of labor (2005=100)    91.22 27.75 44.26 135.71 
Price of capital (2005=100)    84.71 30.43 45.92 173.95 








Table I-2. Mean Values of Estimated Market Power Parameters from True and Alternative Models 
Simulated (true) market 
structure 















                    
















































































































































 Note: numbers in parentheses are standard deviations. 
 * indicates significant at the 5% significance level. 
In the separated model under two-way bilateral imperfect competition framework, processor has oligopoly market power while retailer has oligopsony market 
power. In the combined model under two-way bilateral imperfect competition framework, processor has oligopoly and oligopsony market power but retailer is 
price taker. 




Table I-3. Model Selection Tests between True and Alternative Models based on the Likelihood Dominance Criterion 
Simulated (True) market structure 
Estimated market structure 
Perfect 







competition Combined Separated 
Perfect competition 
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Four-way bilateral imperfect 
competition 
   1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 - 









  - - -  - - 
Note:   - simulated market structure,   - estimated market structure, and  - undefined 
In the separated model under two-way bilateral imperfect competition framework, processor has oligopoly market power while retailer has oligopsony market 









Simulated (true) market structure 
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(0.4347)   
 
Four-way bilateral 

























Note:    - bias between the estimated market power parameter minus true market power parameter is zero,   - bias is not zero. 
Values in parentheses are standard deviations. 
* indicate that reject the null hypothesis (  ) at the 5% significant level. 
In the separated model under two-way bilateral imperfect competition specification, processor has oligopoly power while retailer has oligopsony power. In the 
combined model under two-way bilateral imperfect competition, retailer has oligopoly and oligopsony power.  
Perfect competition:       ,       ,      ,       .  Monopoly:       ,       ,      ,       .  
Monopsony:       ,        ,       ,       .  Combined two-way bilateral:       ,       ,      ,       .  
Separated two-way bilateral:       ,       ,      ,       . Four-way bilateral:       ,       ,      ,       . 
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Table I-5. Mean Values and Confidence Intervals for Market Power Index Bias between True and Alternative Models 
Simulated (true) market 
structure 
Estimated market structures 





Two-way bilateral imperfect competition 
 
Four-way bilateral imperfect 
competition 




               
(2.5th ,97.5th) 
(2.5th , 





































Monopsony (  ) 
-0.87* 
(-0.90, -.83) 


































































































 - - 
Note:    -bias between the estimated industry index and true industry index is zero,   - bias is not zero. 
* indicate that the bias of market power index is significantly different zero.  
In the separated model under two-way bilateral imperfect competition framework, processor has oligopoly market power while retailer has oligopsony market 
power. In the combined model, processor has oligopoly and oligopsony market power but retailer is price taker. 








APPENDIX A: Derivations of First order conditions from Profit maximizations of 
Processors and Retailers Firms. 
1. Profit maximization problem for processor j: 
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Similarly the marginal products of other inputs are derived for processor j.  
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2. Profit maximization problem for retailer i. 
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Similarly the marginal products of other inputs are derived for retailer i. 
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APPDENDIX B: Derivation of the Marginal Product for Processors’ and Retailers’  
1. Derivation of Processors’ marginal product of Inputs. 
From equations (28), we have: 
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Marginal products of inputs for processor firm are: 
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2. Derivation of Retailers’ marginal product of Inputs.. 
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Marginal products of inputs for retailer firm are: 
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APPENDIX C: Variance-Covariance Matrix and Parameter Values used in Monte Carlo 
Simulations  
1. Variance-covariance matrix used in generating industry data for five market 
structures such as: perfect competition, monopoly, monopsony, separated two-








           
      
      
            
      
      
        
      0.096          
    
  0.011 0.089         
    
  0.007 0.049 0.023        
    
  -0.000 0.036 0.013 0.062       
      -0.017 -0.012 -0.014 -0.043 0.040      
    
  0.002 0.024 -0.013 0.005 0.037 0.042     
    
  0.008 -0.023 0.011 -0.064 0.039 0.049 0.018    
    
  0.000 -0.027 -0.007 0.007 0.032 0.032 -0.006 0.004   
   -0.029 0.004 0.001 -0.002 0.003 0.001 -0.000 -0.002 0.003  
   0.006 -0.006 0.004 0.005 -0.005 0.003 0.001 -0.001 -0.003 0.013 
 
2. Variance-covariance matrix used in generating industry data for combined two-
way bilateral competition  
           
      
      
         
      0.033      
    
  0.014 0.052     
    
  0.018 0.024 0.015    
    
  0.009 0.027 0.014 0.038   
   -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000  






3. Parameter values (starting values) used in simulations and estimations 
Processors  Retailers 
    0.838      0.686 
    0.589      0.703 
    -1.812      0.163 
    4.685      0.703 
    0.248      -0.072 
    0.224      -0.056 
    0.034      -0.130 
    -0.492      0.402 
    -3.405      0.935 
    -0.625      1.292 
 
 
APPENCIX D: Empirical Specification for Simulation and Estimation for Each Market 
Structure 
1. Perfect competition: All market power parameters (           ) are to be 0 
                                 



















                                   



















                                  





















                                   



















                                 



















                                  



















                                  



















                                   



















2. Monopoly: Processors only have market power in selling processed product to 
retailers which assumed perfectly competitive. 
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3. Monopsony: Retailers only have market power in procuring processed product from 
processors which behave perfectly. 
                      
     ,                        
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4. Separated two-way bilateral imperfect competition: processors only have oligopoly 
power in selling processed product to retailers and retailers, also, only has oligopsony 
power in procuring processed product from processors. 
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5. Combined two-way bilateral imperfect competition: retailers and processors are 
integrated in a single ‘processing/retailing’ sector, which competes imperfectly in 
procuring farm inputs from a perfectly competitive farm sector and in selling 
processed product to consumers. 
                                              ∑   
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The first order condition is:  
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Rearrange with the share equation, then 
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Therefore, the industry share equations are; 
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where,     
   
  
   
 is the share equation for the input. 
6. Four-way bilateral imperfect competition: Bothe processors and retailers have 
oligopoly/oligopsony market power in output and input market. 
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ESTIMATING PROCESSORS’ AND RETAILERS’ MARKET POWER 




The structure of the U.S. beef industry has significantly changed in recent years. At the 
farm level, a multi-year drought in the Southern Plains caused high feed prices and large 
financial losses, and as a result, many small cattle feeders went out of business. At the 
processor level, the beef packing industry has increasingly concentrated. The market 
share of the largest four packers has been increased from 78% to 85% for the period from 
1998 to 2010. Furthermore, at the retail level, sales by the 20 largest food retailers have 
increased from 39.2% in 1992 to 64.2 % of  total U.S. grocery sales in 2009 (ERS, 
USDA). Therefore, it is not surprising that the possibility of non-competitive market 
conduct exists in both beef processing and retail industries. 
 Most studies in the industrial organization literature assume that processors have 
potential oligopoly and/or oligopsony market power (Azzam and Schroeter 1995; Azzam 
1997; Paul 2001; Lopez, Azzam and Espana 2002). These studies tend to focus on 
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processors alone and assume that market power exercise is limited to firms on one side of 
the market. 
A few studies consider the possibility that a single firm may exert market power 
simultaneously in both output and input markets (Schroeter 1988; Atkinson and Kerkvliet 
1989; Azzam and Pagoulatos 1990; Mei and Sun 2008). In these studies, an integrated 
firm representing both processors and retailers is allowed to exercise market power in 
both output and input markets, while firms on the other side of the transaction, for 
example, input providers including cattle producers, are set to be perfectly competitive. 
Recent studies consider bilateral relationship between processors and retailers and 
measure their potential market power exertion (Raper, Love and Shumway 2000; Chung 
and Tostao 2012). Although these studies consider bilateral relationship between 
processors and retailers with more flexible models, in each case, processors and retailers 
are assumed to be perfectly competitive at least one side of the transaction. Furthermore, 
in these studies, conjectural elasticities of output and input markets are restricted to be 
identical because the production technology is restricted to fixed proportions between the 
output and input.  
The objective of this study is to measure the degrees of market power in the U.S. 
beef industry while considering the full range of bilateral imperfect competition between 
processors and retailers. Specifically, we separate processors from the integrated 
processor-retailer sector that are typically used in many previous studies and consider 
separate market power parameters for input and output markets of processing and retail 
sectors. Therefore, both oligopoly and oligopsony market power are estimated for 
retailers and processors, separately. Unlike many previous studies, our study uses the 
primal production function approach without restricting conjectural elasticities in output 
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and input markets to be identical. After estimating conjectural elasticities from input and 
output markets, market power index
1
 that is similar to the Lerner index is derived and 
estimated to reflect both buying and selling sides of an industry market power. Finally, 
our study investigates the sensitivity
2
 of our results using alternative functional forms of 
production function. We estimate market power parameters and market power indices 
with three different functional forms of productions such as transcendental logarithmic 
(TL), generalized Leontief (GL), and normalized quadratic (NQ) functional forms.  
Empirical results show that processors and retailers exercise market power in both 
input and output markets in the U.S. beef industry. Furthermore, estimated market power 




Many researchers have used the new empirical industrial organization (NEIO) framework 
to investigate market power issues in agricultural industries (Azzam and Schroeter 1995; 
Azzam 1997; Paul 2001; Lopez, Azzam and Espana 2002). Azzam and Schroeter (1995) 
models the tradeoff between oligopsony power and cost efficiency resulting from in the 
beef packing industry and find that non-competitive effects of consolidation are about 
half the actual cost savings from scale economies. Azzam (1997) estimates oligopsony 
market power effects and cost efficiency effect for the U.S. beef packing industry and 
show that the cost efficiency effect is larger than oligopsony market power effect. Paul 
(2001) measures packers’ market power in the beef input market and cost (utilization, 
scale, and scope) economies using monthly cost and revenue data from a survey of the 
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forty-three largest U.S. beef packing plants between 1992 to 1993. Lopez, Azzam and 
Espana (2002) develop the oligopoly model similar to the Azzam’s oligopsony model to 
estimate market power effects and efficiency effects in 32 U.S. food processing industries 
and finds that oligopoly power effects outweigh cost efficiency effects in the meat 
packing industry. These studies only consider processors’ oligopoly and/or oligopsony 
power and find some level of market power in the U.S. beef processing industry. 
A few studies (Schroeter 1988; Chung and Tostao 2012) consider the possibility 
of imperfect competition in both output and input markets. Schroeter (1988) considers the 
possibility that a single firm may exert market power simultaneously in both its output 
and input markets, but in each case, processors’ and retailers’ firms are assumed to be 
price takers. Chung and Tostao (2012) consider the bilateral relationship between 
processors and retailers. Model constructs from integrated processor-retailer model 
separately and estimate the tradeoff between market power and cost efficiency. They find 
that cost efficiency gains dominate potential oligopoly market power effects from 
increased concentration in the U.S. beef industry. Although these studies consider and 
examine the potential market power in input and output markets, the models developed in 
these studies are yet not flexible enough to consider the full range of the bilateral market 
power relationship. These models do not allow one to estimate the potential market 
power of retailers and processors separately in each of input and output markets. 
Furthermore, these studies use the dual cost function approach and have restrictions in 
deriving an expression for conjectural elasticity in the input market unless the production 
technology assumed fixed proportions between output and input.  
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Since the dual (cost function) approach has arguments deriving an expression for 
conjectural elasticity in input market, a few studies consider a production function 
approach that allows different conjectural elasticities in input and output markets without 
the symmetry assumption (Azzam and Pagoulatos 1990; Chang and Tremblay 1991). 
Azzam and Pogoulatos (1990) extend the traditional conjectural approach to the analysis 
of imperfect competition in output and input markets simultaneously. This study 
separately derives conjectural elasticities in imperfect input and output markets and 
estimates the market power effects for the U.S. meat packing industry. Findings indicate 
that the industry is imperfectly competitive in both input and output markets. The degree 
of non-competitiveness is similar in both markets but the market power in input market is 
significantly higher than that in output market. Chang and Tremblay (1991) provide the 
theoretical analysis of oligopsony and oligopoly in input and output markets and develops 
the firm and market power index to measure oligopsony and oligopoly market power. 
Although these studies make contributions towards understanding of imperfect 
competition, these studies do not consider potential bilateral market power effects 
between retailers and processors. These studies have a priori assumptions regarding the 
direction of market power exertion unless distinguished the conjectural elasticities in the 
output and input markets to be identical. 
 Our study measures degrees of market power in the U.S. beef industry, but differs 
from previous studies in four areas. First, we consider processors’ and retailers’ profit 
maximization problems separately and develop by far the most flexible model that 
considers full range of the bilateral market power relationship between retailers and 
processors. Therefore, unlike previous studies, the flexible model developed in this study 
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estimates four conjectural elasticities that reflect potential oligopoly and oligopsony 
power for processors and retailers, separately. Second, our model is based on the 
production function approach so that it does not require the symmetry assumption on 
conjectural elasticities between input and output markets. Most previous studies are based 
on the dual approach which requires identical conjectural elasticities of factor and output 
markets under the fixed proportions technology assumption. Third, our study estimates 
market power indices which reflect both buying and selling sides of an industry market 
power. Finally, a sensitivity analysis is conducted to examine if our finding are sensitive 
to alternative functional forms of production function 
 
Theoretical Framework 
In general, there are two approaches in the theoretical framework of conjectural elasticity 
in the literature. One is the primal production function-based approach (Azzam and 
Pagoulatos 1990; Chang and Tremblay 1991; Mei and Sun 2008) and the other is the dual 
cost function-based approach (Schroeter 1988; Azzam 1997; Lopez, Azzam and Espana 
2002; Chung and Tostao 2012). In this paper, the primal production function approach is 
used because it is not imposing that conjectural elasticities between input and output 
market are to be identical. 
Consider a processor firm that uses a vector of inputs,  , with associated prices,  , 
to produce a single output,   . The jth firm’s production function can be stated as:  
(1)                                 
      
 
     ,                                                                  
where   
 
 is the output produced,   
 
 is the farm input,     (u=1, …, U.) represents non-
farm inputs like as labor, capital, and material that is purchased from a competitive 
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market. Furthermore, assume each firm exercises some degree of market power in 
purchasing the farm input   
 
 and in selling its output,   
 
 to retailers. Let the inverse 
market demand curve facing the industry in its output market be given by: 
(2)                                        , 
where    is the total industry output, and    is the price per unit of the processed output. 
The inverse market supply function for specific factor input is given by:  
(3)                                       ,                                                                           
where    and    ∑   
  
    are farm input price and total industry input with N number 
of farmers. Denoting the price of non-farm inputs by       , and assuming each firm 
is a profit maximizing. The profit maximization problem for the j
th
 firm can be presented 
as: 
(4)                                    
          
          
 
 ∑      
 
   .                                           
The first order conditions corresponding to this profit maximization problem are given by: 
(5)                               
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where       







 is the j
th
 firm’s conjectural elasticity in the output market; 
                 







 is the j
th
 firm’s conjectural elasticity in the farm input market; 
               
   
   
   
  
  
 is the price elasticity of output demand; 
               
 
 
   
   
  
  
 is the price elasticity of the farm input supply;  
            
  
  




  is the marginal product of the farm input used by firm j; 
and       
   
 
    
 is the marginal product of the u
th
 input used by firm j. 
Now, Consider a retailer firm that uses a vector of inputs,  , with associated 
prices,  , to produce a single output,   , for sale to consumers. Let the ith firm’s 
production function is defined as:  
(9)                                  
   (  
     ),                                                                 
where   
  is retail output,   
 
 is the processed input,     (k=1,…, K) represent other inputs 
such as labor, capital, and materials that are purchased from competitive markets. The 
inverse market demand function is given by: 
(10)                                       ,                                                                            
where    ∑   
  
    is the total industry output, and  
  is the price per unit of the retail 
output. The inverse market supply of the specific factor is given by:  
(11)                                       ,                                                                           
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where    and    ∑   
  
    are market processed input price and total industry input 
with  N number of processors. Denoting the price of inputs by        , and assuming 
each firm is a profit maximize. 
The profit maximization problem for the i
th
 firm can be stated as: 
(12)                                   
          
          
  ∑      
 
   .                                    
Then, the first order conditions corresponding to this profit maximization problem are: 
(13)                                
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where    
   





 is the i
th
 retailer firm’s conjectural elasticity in the output market; 
             







 is the i
th
 retailer firm’s conjectural elasticity in the input market; 
           
   
   
   
  
  
 is the price elasticity of output demand; 
           
  
   
   
  
  
 is the price elasticity of the processed input supply; 
           
  




  is the marginal product of the processed input used by firm i;    
and       
   
 
    
 is the marginal product of the n
th
 input used by firm i. 
The conjectural elasticities,                 provide useful benchmarks for 
testing for competitive behavior and allow one to carry out various tests about market 
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(Appelbaum 1982; Azzam and Pagoulatos 1990). The parameter    [   ] and    
[   ] measure the departures from competition in selling the output.     [   ] and 
   [   ] measure the departures from competition in buying the input. If both    and 
   are equal to 0 in equations (7) and (8), we have the perfectly competitive case where 
each firm equates the value of marginal product of an input to the perceived marginal 
cost of the input. In the extreme case where both    and    are equal to 1, we obtain the 
monopoly and monopsony case. Other combinations of market structures denote various 
degrees of oligopoly/oligopsony power with higher values of both    and    indicating 
greater departures from competitive behavior. The parameters          play a similar 
role in terms of retailing sector, denoting possible perfect competition, 
monopoly/monopsony case and various degrees of oligopoly and oligopsony power.  
To measure the degree of market power in input and output markets, Chang and 
Tremblay (1991) develop and define an oligopoly/oligopsony index (market power index) 
for firm and industry level. This approach is similar to that developed by Lerner (1932), 
who defined the index of monopoly price distortion as the difference between the output 
price and marginal cost divided by the price. The market power index is the difference 
between the value of the marginal product and the input price all divided by the value of 
the marginal product. The market power index for processor firm j is derived such as: 
(17)                                
  [  (  
  
 )    ]  [  (  
  
 )]. 
Rearranging this equation with market power parameters yields: 














Because the value of the marginal product must be greater than or equal to    
which is greater than zero, the value of  
 
 ranges from 0 to 1. When the factor is paid 
equal to the value of its marginal product,   (  
  
 )    ,  
    and the markets are 
allocated efficiently. As the difference in the value of the marginal product and the factor 
price increases,  
 
 approaches 1. Thus, greater inefficiency is implied by the higher 
values of  
 




  reflects the non-competitive performance in the 
output market and reduces to the well-known Lerner index of 
 
  








  for the pure monopsonist. The market power index is quite general because no 
restrictions are imposed on the conjectural elasticities of the firm (i.e., they may range 
from perfectly competitive to collusive). The index for retailers is obtained in an 
analogous manner for firm level and plays a similar role. The index for retailer firm i is 
derived such as: 











In practice, the absence of firm-level data generally requires an additional 
assumption to make the preceding analysis relevant to the behavior of the industry as 
whole.  We assume that at equilibrium, conjectural elasticities in processing and retail 
sectors are invariant across firms, i.e.,           , and          . The 
conjectural elasticities in the retailing sector, also, are invariant across the firm    
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       and          . Then, the aggregate analogue of the optimality 
condition in processing and retailing sector can be written as:  
(20)                               
  
  
 (  
 
  





  , 
(21)                               
  
  
 (  
 
  
 )    ,                              
(22)                               
  
  
 (  
 
  





  , 
(23)                               
  
  
 (  
 
  
 )    .          
Therefore, the industry-level market power index for processors and retailers can be 
stated as:                        


























While various possibilities of retailer-processor vertical interactions exist, we consider 
the following three cases to compare results of the full-range bilateral market power 
model with those of traditional NEIO models. First, processors and retailers are assumed 
to be integrated in a single ‘processing-retailing’ sector that is allowed to have oligopoly 
and oligopsony market power (e.g., Schroeter 1988; Azzam and Pagoulatos 1990; Mei 
and Sun 2008) . Second, retailers are only allowed to have oligopsony power, but 
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processors are only allowed to have oligopoly power (e.g., Raper, Love and Shumway 
2000). Finally, retailers are allowed to have both oligopoly and oligopsony power, and 
processors are also allowed to possess both oligopsony and oligopoly power.  
 
Case 1. Imperfect competition in a single ‘processing/retailing’ sector 
In this case, retailers and processors are combined in a single ‘processing/retailing’ sector, 
which competes imperfectly in procuring farm inputs from a perfectly competitive farm 
sector and in selling processed product to consumers
3
. 
 The profit maximization problem for a representative ‘processor/retailer’ is: 
(26)                                               
           
 
 ∑      
 
   ,                              
where    ,     and    are retailer output, retail output price and farm input price, 
respectively. The total supply of processed output is represented by     ∑   
   
   . The 
first order condition for this maximization problem is: 
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Rearranging equations (27) and (28), we obtain: 
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where       






   
 is the firm i
th
 conjectural elasticity in the output market;  
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 is the firm i
th
 conjectural elasticity in the farm input market; 
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 is the price elasticity of the farm input supply; 
            
  
  




  is the marginal product of the farm input used by firm i; 
and       
    
    
 is the marginal product of the u
th
 input used by firm i. 
To estimate these equations at the industry level, we assume that the conjectural 
elasticities are invariant across firms due to the absence of price and quantity data at the 
firm level. Then, from equations (29) and (30), we have: 
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Case 2. Two-way bilateral imperfect competition 
In this case, retailers have oligopsony power in procuring processed output from 
processors while processors are allowed to have oligopoly power in selling processed 
output to retailers. Case 2 is different from Case 1 because Case 2 considers retailers and 
processors separately. This bilateral oligopoly and oliopsony model is similar to the 
model considered in the previous study (Raper, Love, and Shumway 2000). First, the 
profit maximization problem for a representative processor is presented as:   
(33)                                   
          
          
 
 ∑      
 
   .                                         
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The first-order necessary condition for the maximization problem is given by: 
(34)                               
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Rearranging equations (34) and (35) gives: 
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Secondly, the retailers’ profit maximization problem is defined as: 
(38)                                   
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   .                                    
The first-order necessary condition corresponding to this profit maximization problem is:  
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Rearranging equations (39) and (40) gives: 
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Imposing an assumption of symmetric conjectural elasticities in equations (36), (37), (41) 
and (42), we have industry share equations as:   
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Case 3. Four-way bilateral imperfect competition 
This is the most flexible framework to consider the full range of bilateral imperfect 
competition. Retailers and processors are allowed to exercise oligopoly and oligopsony 
power in both procuring inputs and selling output. Therefore, in this case, four 
conjectural elasticities are expected to be estimated from the model to represent potential 
oligopoly and oligopsony power of retailers and processors. This bilateral imperfect 
competition model nests the retailer sector of Case II and the processor sector of Case III 
of Chung and Tostao (2012). The profit maximization problem for a representative 
processor is defined as:  
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The first-order necessary condition for the maximization problem is:  
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The profit maximization problem for the retailer is defined as:  
(52)                                   
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   .                                    
The first-order necessary conditions corresponding to this profit maximization problem 
are: 
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Then, with the symmetry assumption in conjectural elasticities, industry share equations 
are: 
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Selecting Functional Forms 
Many studies estimating the degree of market power use the Leontief type technology. 
However, several studies in the literature (e.g., Love and Shumway 1994; Azzam and 
Pagoulatos 1991; and Sexton 2000) suggest that market power estimates could be 
sensitive to selected functional forms. Our study considers three different types of 
functional forms for a sensitivity analysis on estimates of market power parameters and 
market power indices. The three flexible functional forms selected for this analysis 
include transcendental logarithmic (TL), generalized Leontief (GL), and normalized 
quadratic (NQ) functional forms
4
. These three functions satisfy the Diewert flexibility
5
 
and may be interpreted as second-order Taylor-series expansions about different points 
with different transformations of variables (Thompson 1988). 
 
Transcendental Logarithmic (TL) production function 
The Transcendental Logarithmic (TL) production function (Christensen, Jorgenson, and 
Lau 1973) is one of the most flexible often used functional forms in empirical studies. It 
does not assume the rigid premise of perfect or “smooth” substitution between production 
factors or perfect competition in the production factor market but permits to pass from a 
linear relationship between output and production factors. Due to its properties, the TL 
production function can be used for the second order approximation of a linear 
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homogenous production. The TL function for the processor that uses a vector of inputs,  , 
to produce a single output,   , for sale as an input to retailers is given as: 
(61)                                       ∑       
 
    
 
 
∑ ∑            
 
   
 
   ,                           
where Z includes total industry inputs of farm input(  ) , labor (  ), capital (  ), and 
material (  ),  
  is total processed industry output of beef products. The TL is 




(62)                                   (   ∑        
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.                                                                       
Equations (62) is used to estimate share equations at the industry level for an integrated 
processor/retailer sector of Case 1, and processor sector of cases 2 and 3. Similarly, the 
marginal product of the k
th
 input in producing a retailers’ output    is derived as: 
(63)                                   (   ∑        
 
   )
  
  
,                                                               
where X includes total industry inputs of farm input(  ) , labor (  ), capital (  ), and 
material (  ). Equation (63) is applied to retailer share equations of cases 2 and 3 for 
empirical estimation. 
 
Generalized Leontief (GL) production function 
The generalized Leontief (GL) production function (Diewert 1971) is another flexible 
functional form that permits partial elasticities of substitution between inputs to vary. A 
processor’s GL production function that uses a vector of inputs,  , to produce a single 
output,   , for sale as an input to retailers is given as: 
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(64)                                   ∑ ∑    
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where    is processed output. Z are total industry inputs of farm input (  ), labor (  ), 
capital (  ), and material (  ). From equation (64), the marginal product of the i
th
 input is: 






   .                
Similarly, the marginal product of the k
th
 input in producing a retailer’s output    is 
derived as: 






   .                                                                  
 
Normalized Quadratic (NQ) production function 
The normalized quadratic (NQ) production function (Lau, 1978a, p. 194) is also 
commonly used due to its flexibility. The Normalized Quadratic is an attractive 
functional form for use in empirical applications as correct curvature can be imposed in a 
parsimonious way without losing the desirable property of flexibility. The NQ production 
function for the processor that uses a vector of inputs,  , to produce a single output,   , 
for sale as an input to retailers is given as: 
(67)                                     ∑     
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   ,                               
where Z are total industry inputs of farm input, labor, capital, and materials, pY is the 
total processed industrial output of beef products. The NQ is symmetric in coefficients, 
i.e.,        . From the above equation, the marginal product for the i
th
 input is 
(68)                                   (   ∑      
 
   ).                                                                           
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Similarly, the marginal product of the k
th
 input in producing a retailer’s output    is 
derived as: 
(69)                                   (   ∑      
 
   ).                                                                 
Each system of equations is estimated jointly through Generalized Method of 
Moments (GMM)
6
 technique (Hansen 1982) using the PROC MODEL Procedure in SAS.  
 
Data 
The data used in estimating the system of equations are monthly data series for the U.S. 
beef industry ranging from years 1980 to 2011. The data used in this study are compiled 
from the National Agricultural Statistic Service (NASS), Grain Inspection, Packers and 
Stockyards Administration (GIPSA), and the Economic Research Service (ERS) of the 
United State Department of Agriculture (USDA). 
Total beef production represented by steer and heifer slaughter quantities is 
compiled from Livestock Slaughter Annual Summary of National Agricultural Statistics 
Service (NASS), United States Department of Agriculture (USDA). Total cattle input 
supply is represented by the cattle slaughter quantity in total live weight (NASS, USDA), 
and prices of labor, capital, and material inputs for the U.S. beef packing industry 
(NAICS code: 3116) are obtained from the Industry Productivity and Costs Database of 
Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS), United States Department of Labor (USDL). The 
Herfindahl-Hirschman index for the U.S. beef processing industry is the steer and heifer 
slaughter concentration index compiled from several annual reports from the Packers and 
Stockyards Statistical Report (1996-2011), Grain Inspection, Packers and Stockyards 
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Administration (GIPSA), USDA. Prices series of wholesale and cattle is provided by 
ERS, USDA.  
The total US commercial beef production which is used as the retail output 
obtained from red meat year book, Economic Research Service (ERS), United States 
Department of Agriculture (USDA). The prices of labor, capital, and food processing 
materials for the food processing industry are obtained from the Major Sector Multifactor 
Productivity Index Database of BLS (USDL). Retail Herfindhal-Hirschman Index (HHI) 
data are available only for years 1992, 1997, 2002, and 2007 which is estimated using 
sales data of the 50 largest grocery stores in the United States. Given the paucity of data, 
the Herfindhal-Hirschman Index data for the remaining years are estimated in time series 
regression. The retail sales data are obtained from several issues of the Progressive 
Grocer Magazine (Progressive Grocer, 1970-2002) and the U.S. Census Bureau. The 
retail price of beef is compiled from ERS, USDA. 
For the beef supply equation and the processed beef supply equation, the 
productivity of labor, capital and the food processing materials are obtained from the 
Major Sector Multifactor Productivity Index Database (BLS, USDL). The productivity of 
labor, capital and materials for the U.S. animal slaughtering and processing industries are 
obtained from the Industry Productivity and Cost Database (BLS, USDL). The 
definitions and descriptive statistics of these variables are presented in Table II-1. 
 
Empirical Results 
Parameter estimates of the three cases of imperfect competition market structures with 
the Trans-log (TL) production function are reported in Table II-2. For the case of a single 
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‘processing/retailing’ sector, Case 1, all parameter estimates are statistically significant at 
the 5% level except    , parameter estimate of the average cost share of farm input. The 
estimated market power parameters are 0.0872 and 0.3022 which are significant at the 5% 
level. The statistical significance of these estimates evidences the existence of market 
power in both selling beef and procuring cattle markets. When the two-way bilateral 
imperfection is modeled, Case 2, all parameter estimates are statistically significant at the 
5% significance level including estimates of market power parameters of processors’ 
oligopoly and retailers’ oligopsony, 0.0333 and 0.0272, respectively except    . The 
statistical significance of the market power estimates implies that there exists market 
power in both processors’ selling and retailers’ buying markets. However, degrees of 
market power estimated from the two-way model are significantly lower than those from 
the single sector case. In Case 3, all parameter estimates are statistically significant at the 
5% level except     which implies constant capital share elasticity with respect to capital, 
estimates of processor oligopsony and retailer oligopoly power. Estimates of conjectural 
elasticities for output and input markets are 0.0866and 0.0162 for processors, and 0.0125 
and 0.0420 for retailers. Therefore, results from the four-way model suggest that 
processors exert market power in selling beef while retailers exercise market power in 
procuring beef from processors. Processors’ oligopoly power is larger than other market 
power parameters.  
Estimation results from the generalized Leontief production function (GL) are 
reported in Table II-3. In Case 1, all parameter estimates are significant at least at the 5% 
level. Estimates of conjectural elasticities for input and output markets are 0.1936 and 
0.3078, respectively. The result suggests the existence of market power both in output 
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and input market. In Case 2, all parameter estimates are significant at the 5% level. 
Estimates of market power parameters for processors’ oligopoly and retailers’ oligopsony 
are 0.0430 and 0.0143, respectively. The statistical significance of market power 
estimates indicate that there exists significant market power in both processed beef 
product output and procuring processed input markets. In Case 3, 21 of 24 estimated 
parameters are significant at the 5% level. However, retailers’ oligopoly and olioposony 
power are not significant. Therefore, the statistical significance of estimates of market 
power parameters shows that the evidence of market power exertion of processor in both 
selling and buying markets.  
 Parameter estimates with the normalized quadratic (NQ) production function are 
reported in Table II-4. In Case 1, 16 of 17 parameter estimates are significant at the 5% 
significance level. The estimated market power parameters for output and input markets, 
0.3419 and 0.2104 are significant at the 5% level. The statistical significance of these 
estimates evidences the existence of market power in both selling beef and procuring 
cattle markets. In Case 2, all parameter estimates are significant at the 5% significance 
level. The market power parameters estimates for output and input markets are 0.0398 
and 0.0328, respectively. Both of them are significant at the 5% significance level. This 
implies that there exists market power exercise in both output and input markets. In Case 
3, all parameter estimates are significant at the 5% level. Estimates of conjectural 
elasticities for output and input markets are 0.1481 and 0.0355 for processors, and 0.1478 
and 0.1018 for retailers, respectively. The estimated elasticities are significant at the 5% 
level. Results from the four-way model suggest that retailers exercise market power in 
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both selling beef and procuring processed beef, also processors exert market power in 
selling processed beef to retailers and procuring cattle input. 
Estimated market power parameters from tables 2-4 are compared across 
alternative market structures and production functions and are reported in Table II-5. 
With the TL production function, the differences in conjectural elasticities between Case 
3 and Case 1 are -0.0710 and -0.2602 for processors’ oligopsony and retailers’ oligopoly 
power, respectively, and are significant at the 5% level. The result suggests that a single 
‘processing/retailing’ sector model with the TL production function tends to overestimate 
market power than the four-way model in both input and output markets. Comparing 
processors’ oligopoly and retailers’ oligopsony power between Cases 3 and 2 show only 
statistical difference in retailer oligopsony power. With the GL production function, the 
integrated single sector model, Case 1, also results in a larger estimate for processors’ 
oligopsony power than the four-way model, Case 3, with the statistical significance at the 
5% level. However, the retailers’ oligopoly power shows no statistical difference between 
Cases 3 and 1. Comparing cases 3 and 2 shows that the two-way model with the GL 
production function shows no statistical difference.  
With the NQ production function, the integrated single sector model, Case 1, also 
tend to overestimate processors’ oligopsony power than the four-way model in input 
market. However, the retailers’ oligopoly power shows no statistical difference between 
Case 3 and 1. Comparing cases 3 and 2 shows that the four-way model with the TL 
production function tends to overestimate market power than the two-way model in both 
input and output markets. Overall, estimates of market power parameters are sensitive to 
types of market structure models and functional forms of productions function.  With 
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production functions, the integrated model tends to overestimate market power 
parameters while the two-way model tends to underestimate them compared to the four-
way model.  No statistical difference is found when the TL and GL functions are used 
comparing the four-way model and the two-way model. 
To compare overall market power exertion between processing and retail sectors, 
market power indices are estimated using parameter estimates reported in tables 2-4 and 
are reported in Table II-6. With the TL production function, market power indices in all 
three cases of market structures are significant at the 5% significance level except 
processor’s market power index in Case 3. Comparing market power indices in Cases 3 
and 1, retailers’ market power index, 0.6714, in Case 1 is larger than that of four-way 
model, 0.2402. This result is statistically significant at 5% significance level. When 
market power indices are compared in cases 3 and 2, no statistical difference is found 
between processors’ and retailers’ market power. The results indicate that overall market 
power represented by market power indices is overestimated when market power is 
estimated using the integrated sector model with the TL production function.  With the 
GL production function, all market power indices in processors and retailers are 
significant at the 5% level. Retailers’ market power index from Case 1 is larger than 
those from cases 2 and 3, while processors’ market power index from Case 2 is smaller 
than those from cases 1 and 3. Comparing market power indices in Cases 3 and 1, 
processors’ market power index and retailers’ market power index are 0.5634 and 0.6839, 
in case 1 are larger than those of four-way model, 0.0958 and 0.6763. When market 
power indices are compared in cases 3 and 2, market power indices for processor and 
retailer are larger in the four-way model than those of two-way model. However, only 
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retailers’ market power is statistically significant at the 5% level.  When market power is 
estimated with the GL production function, the processor and retailer market power are 
overestimated from the integrated sector while the processor and retailer market power 
are underestimated from the two-way model. With the NQ production function, all 
market power indices are significant at the 5% significance level. Retailers’ market 
power is only statistically difference between cases 3 and 1.  However, differences in 
processors’ and retailers’ market power between cases 3 and 2 are statistically significant 
at the 5% level.  The results indicate that the two-way model tends to underestimate the 
market power parameters and integrated as a single ‘processing/retailing’ sector model 
overestimate the market power parameters compared to the four-way model. Overall, the 
results show that estimates of market power indices are sensitive to types of market 
structure models and functional forms of productions function. 
 
Conclusions 
Most studies in the industrial organization literature have estimated potential market 
power effects in the U.S. beef industry. These studies assess market power effects of 
integrated retailer-processor industry while paying little attention to the retailers’ 
potential market power. Recent studies consider bilateral relationship between processors 
and retailers and measure the potential market power effects from both sides of the 
markets. However, these studies have one limitation that conjectural elasticities are 
identical in output and input markets unless the production technology is restricted to be 
fixed proportion between input and output markets due to use of the dual cost function 
approach.   
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This paper considers bilateral imperfect competition between processors and 
retailers and employs the production function approach to measure the degree of market 
power in the U.S. beef industry. The production function approach allows deriving the 
conjectural elasticities without imposing the symmetry assumption in input and output 
markets. Using this framework, our study estimates conjectural elasticities of input and 
output markets for processors and retailers. After estimating conjectural elasticities from 
input and output markets, a market power index is derived and estimated to assess both 
selling and buying side of the degree of industry market power. Estimated market power 
parameters and market power indices are compared with those from two alternative 
market structures that have been widely used in previous studies and compared with three 
different types of production functions such as Trans-log, generalized Leontief and 
normalized quadratic functional forms to investigate the sensitivity of our results. 
Although estimates vary over alternative modeling approaches and functional forms of 
production function, overall results from the full-range, four-way model show the 
presence of market power exercise in both output and input markets between processors 
and retailers.  In particular, when TL, GL, and NQ production functions are used in the 
NEIO specifications, the integrated model tends to overestimate market power 
parameters while the two-way model tends to underestimate them compared to the four-
way model.  When market power indices are constructed using the estimated market 
power parameters from different functional forms of production function, the direction of 
over- or under-estimation was found across alternative modeling approaches. One general 
conclusion is that estimates of market power are sensitive to types of market structure 
models and functional forms of productions function. Therefore, any erroneous choice of 
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market structure model and functional form of production function could result in 




















1. This approach is similar to that developed by Lerner (1932), who defined the 
index of monopoly price distortions as the difference between the (output) price 
and marginal cost divided by the price.  
2. Love and Shumway (1994), Azzamd and Pagoulatos (1990), and Sexton (2000) 
noted that market power estimates could be sensitive to selected functional form. 
3. This bilateral oligopoly/oligopsony model is similar to the Schroeter’s models 
(1988). 
4. See Thompson (1988), Perroni and Rutherford (1996), and Diewert (2009). 
5. Diewert flexibility or local flexibility implies that an approximating functional 
form conveys zero error (perfect approximation) for an arbitrary function and its 
first two derivatives at a particular point. Diewert’s flexible functional form (FFF) 
requires that an FFF have parameter values such that the FFF and its first and 
second order derivatives are equal to the arbitrary function and its first and second 
order derivatives (Griffin, Montgomery, and Rister 1987; Thompson 1988). 
6. GMM allows estimation under the restrictions implied by the theory; there is no 
need to add distributional assumptions that are not implied by the theory. GMM 
minimizes a weighted sum of the squared deviations, in which the weights reflect 
the variances and co-variances, and does not guarantee an efficient estimator, but 
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Table II-1. Descriptive Statistics of Variables Used in the Empirical Estimation  
(1980.1-2011.12, N=384). 
Variable Symbol Mean SD Minimum Maximum 
Herfindahl Hirschman index 
for steer and heifer slaughter 
   0.1646 0.0475 0.0561 0.2268 
Herfindahl Hirschman index 
for grocery retailers 
   0.0397 0.0247 0.0081 0.0763 
4 firm concentration ratio    71.5055 14.804 35.7 91.377 
4 firm concentration ratio for 
grocery retailers 
   20.033 10.184 3.014 37.052 
Commercial beef production 
(billion lbs.) 
   2.0489 0.1825 1.653 2.512 
Wholesale beef production 
(billion lbs.) 
   2.7377 0.2218 2.2275 4.1485 
Cattle slaughter weight 
(billion lbs.) 
   3.4221 0.2772 2.7843 4.1485 
Retail price of beef ($/cwt)    120.28 15.579 92.23 156.41 
Wholesale value of beef 
($/cwt) 
   80.058 3.248 73.926 92.314 
Farm value of beef    69.280 1.299 62.843 74.899 
Labor productivity for food 
and other industry 
(2005=100) 
      94.71 8.24 80.78 109.11 
Capital productivity 
(2005=100) 
      102.78 2.909 96.54 107.48 
Material productivity 
(2005=100) 
      86.04 13.43 67.10 106.19 
Price of labor(2005=100)    109.07 4.361 100.00 119.73 
Price of capital(2005=100)    125.91 13.24 97.06 148.91 
Price of material(2005=100)    93.00 3.737 85.52 100.63 
Labor productivity for 
animal slaughtering and 
processing(2005=100) 
      97.97 8.659 83.57 112.85 
Capital productivity 
(2005=100) 
      101.98 1.974 97.43 105.61 
Material productivity 
(2005=100) 
      91.81 9.077 78.18 114.15 
Price of labor(2005=100)    91.22 27.75 44.26 135.71 
Price of capital(2005=100)    84.71 30.43 45.92 173.95 







Table II-2. Parameter Estimates of NEIO Models with Trans-log Production Function  
(N=384) 
Parameters 










    -1.3493** 0.1267  -0.3084** 0.0130  -0.3022** 0.0139 
    4.0829** 0.1708  1.1628** 0.0160  1.1606** 0.0086 
    0.3340** 0.0461  -0.0770** 0.0015  -0.0727** 0.0009 
    -0.0410** 0.0150  0.1140** 0.0041  0.1097** 0.0017 
    0.0552** 0.0081  -0.0426** 0.0014  -0.0399** 0.0063 
     -1.3947** 0.0656  -0.3895** 0.0161  -0.3827** 0.0070 
     0.0549** 0.0147  -0.0175** 0.0001  -0.0161** 0.0002 
     -0.0017 0.0026  0.0269** 0.0007  0.0257** 0.0001 
     -0.0571** 0.0079  -0.0030** 0.0001  -0.0035** 0.0014 
     0.2772** 0.0335  -0.0502** 0.0011  -0.0471** 0.0002 
     -0.0108** 0.0013  0.0103** 0.0003  0.0088** 0.0001 
     0.0488** 0.0074  -0.0312** 0.0007  -0.0310** 0.0002 
     -0.0025** 0.0006  0.0008** 0.0001  0.0004** 0.0001 
     0.0969** 0.0086  -0.0146** 0.0001  -0.0138** 0.0002 
     -0.0082** 0.0011  -0.0011** 0.0002  -0.0007** 0.0002 
       -1.2037** 0.0568  -1.3011 ** 0.0404 
       3.9159** 0.0571  4.0870** 0.0517 
       0.0332** 0.0077  0.0408** 0.0064 
       -0.0561** 0.0033  -0.0537** 0.0028 
       0.2724** 0.0073  0.2695** 0.0134 
        -0.6161** 0.0321  -0.6750** 0.0204 
        0.0336** 0.0077  0. 0330** 0.0007 
        0.0007 0.0005  0.0006 0.0004 
        0.0643** 0.0005  0.0678** 0.0026 
        0.2745** 0.0068  0.2738** 0.0059 
        -0.0813** 0.0017  -0.0819** 0.0019 
        0.3060** 0.0075  0.3197** 0.0091 
        -0.0303** 0.0004  -0.0285** 0.0007 
        0.0658** 0.0005  0.0660** 0.0018 
        -0.0019** 0.0002  -0.0032** 0.0002 
      0.0333** 0.0005  0.0866** 0.0375 
   0.0872** 0.0259     0.0162 0.0115 
   0.3022** 0.0928     0.0125 0.0215 
      0.0272** 0.0010  0.0420** 0.0092 
** significant at the 5% significance level. 
  : the average cost share of input i in processor sector. 
    : constant input i’s share elasticity with respect to input j. 
   : the average cost share of input i in retailer sector.  
     : constant input i’s share elasticity with respect to input j. 
 ,  : processors’ oligopoly and oligopsony power parameter, respectively. 
 ,  : retailers’ oligopoly and oligopsony power parameter, respectively. 
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Table II-3. Parameter Estimates of NEIO Models with Generalized Leontief Production 
Function                                                                                                                    (N=384)  
 
Parameters 
 Case 1  Case 2  Case 3 
 Coefficient 
Standard  
Error  Coefficient 
Standard  
Error  Coefficient 
Standard  
Error 
     0.7892** 0.0001  0.7650** 0.0001  0.7595** 0.0001 
     -0.6480** 0.0120  -1.7965** 0.0041  -2.0273** 0.0062 
     1.7502** 0.0305  4.4729** 0.0192  5.8177** 0.0074 
     0.4991** 0.0163  0.5620** 0.0039  0.2871** 0.0325 
     0.0528** 0.0005  0.1993** 0.0004  0.2524** 0.0001 
     -0.0018* 0.0010  0.0252** 0.0007  0.0045 0.0005 
     0.0688** 0.0006  0.2357** 0.0005  0.2999** 0.0012 
     0.0860** 0.0096  -0.4178** 0.0035  -0.7941** 0.0066 
     0.0387** 0.0129  -0.3925** 0.0039  -0.7527** 0.0099 
     -1.3160** 0.0149  -3.3593** 0.0051  -3.9010** 0.0054 
        0.7543** 0.0002  0.7553** 0.0007 
        0.3263** 0.0040  -0.0308** 0.0347 
        0.1375** 0.0072  0.9696** 0.0183 
        0.5386** 0.0021  0.2850** 0.0654 
        -0.0649** 0.0004  -0.0252** 0.0080 
        -0.0553** 0.0005  -0.0815** 0.0070 
        -0.1346** 0.0003  -0.1134** 0.0171 
        0.4088** 0.0036  -0.0572** 0.0513 
        1.1822** 0.0031  1.0587** 0.1541 
        1.2973** 0.0022  1.0705** 0.1646 
      0.0430** 0.0002  0.0431** 0.0001 
   0.1936** 0.0095     0.0000** 0.0000 
   0.3078** 0.0042     0.2137 0.2180 
      0.0143** 0.0002  0.0934 0.0807 
** significant at the 5% significance level. 
    and     are the technology coefficients and implies substitutes effect between input i and j. 
 ,  : processors’ oligopoly and oligopsony power parameter, respectively. 
 ,  : retailers’ oligopoly and oligopsony power parameter, respectively. 
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Table II- 4. Parameter Estimates of NEIO Models with Normalized Quadratic Production 
Function                                                                                                                    (N=384) 
 
Parameters 
 Case 1  Case 2  Case 3 
 Coefficient 
Standard  
Error  Coefficient 
Standard  
Error  Coefficient 
Standard  
Error 
    -2.3270** 0.1098  -0.4550** 0.0108  -0.4427** 0.0186 
    2.1617** 0.0631  1.0490** 0.0103  1.0455** 0.0106 
    2.5266** 0.0895  7.4330** 0.0773  5.9918** 0.4202 
    -3.6547** 0.2578  -10.5122** 0.2111  -8.4864** 0.5938 
    1.4227** 0.0858  2.8298** 0.0711  2.2669** 0.1535 
     -0.3965** 0.0182  -0.0694** 0.0030  -0.0691** 0.0031 
     -77.4763** 2.0046  -228.834** 1.7427  -185.384** 12.786 
     484.766** 22.962  1371.51** 20.692  1107.52** 76.471 
     -16.8831** 2.1925  -55.0071** 1.3839  -44.5641** 3.1009 
     -0.1319** 0.0118  -0.1842** 0.0112  -0.1471** 0.0137 
     -0.10133** 0.0133  -0.1788** 0.0134  -0.1446** 0.0149 
     -0.1041** 0.0159  -0.0308** 0.0145  -0.0203** 0.0086 
     -39.3328** 4.5896  -188.027** 2.9290  -151.609** 11.032 
     -42.7686** 2.4146  -140.682** 2.2519  -112.923** 7.8498 
     4.2602 4.2476  50.4202** 4.4903  42.7619** 5.1135 
       -2.0315** 0.0677  -2.0052* 0.0677 
       2.0929** 0.0463  2.0854** 0.0463 
       4.0024** 0.0786  2.8006** 0.0619 
       5.1300** 0.0766  3.8923** 0.0520 
       -0.6919** 0.0470  0.3359** 0.0430 
        -0.4490** 0.0160  -0.4477** 0.0160 
        -150.23** 3.2081  -141.599** 2.9000 
        -248.641** 4.5571  -192.419** 2.9776 
        -2.6724** 0.8389  -21.0773** 0.8714 
        -0.2175** 0.0156  -0.1439** 0.0139 
        -0.4039** 0.0162  -0.3258** 0.0135 
        -0.2616** 0.0130  -0.1721** 0.0110 
        -198.444** 2.6250  -125.394** 1.7979 
        87.7300** 1.1660  85.1574** 1.1292 
        132.634** 1.5291  7.2948** 3.1218 
      0.0328** 0.0004  0.1481** 0.0399 
   0.2104** 0.0014     0.0355** 0.0122 
   0.3419** 0.0004     0.1478** 0.0012 
      0.0398** 0.0012  0.1018** 0.0010 
** significant at the 5% significance level. 
 ,  : processors’ oligopoly and oligopsony power parameter, respectively. 
 ,  : retailers’ oligopoly and oligopsony power parameter, respectively. 
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Notes: numbers in parentheses are standard errors. 
** significant at the 5% significance level. 
  : market power parameter (case 3)-Market power parameter (case 1 or case 2) =0. 
  : market power parameter (case 3) -Market power parameter (case 1 or case 2) 0. 
 ,  : processors’ oligopoly and oligopsony power parameter, respectively. 




















Table II-6. Comparison of Estimated Market Power Indices from Alternative Model 
Structures 
Indices  Case 1  Case 2  Case 3  
Case 3 Vs. 
Case 1 
 Case 3 Vs. 
Case 2 
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Notes: ** significant at the 5% significance level. 
Numbers in parentheses are standard errors. 
  : market power parameter (case 3)-Market power parameter (case 1 or case 2) =0. 
  : market power parameter (case 3) -Market power parameter (case 1 or case 2) 0. 
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